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Abstract
Braess’ paradox illustrates situations when adding a new link to a transport network might
lead to an equilibrium state in which travel times of users will increase. The classical network
configuration introduced by Braess in 1968 to demonstrate the paradox is of fundamental
significance because Valiant and Roughgarden showed in 2006 that ‘the “global” behaviour of
an equilibrium flow in a large random network is similar to that in Braess’ original four-node
example’. Braess’ paradox has been studied mainly in the context of the classical problem
introduced by Braess and his colleagues, assuming a certain type of symmetry in networks.
Specifically, two pairs of links in those networks are assumed to have the same volume-delay
functions. The occurrence of Braess’ paradox for this specific case of network symmetry
was investigated by Pas and Principio in 1997. Such a symmetry is not common in real-life
networks because the parameters of volume-delay functions are associated with roads physical
and functional characteristics, which typically differ from one link to another. This research
provides an extension of previous studies on Braess’ paradox by considering arbitrary volume-
delay functions, i.e. symmetry properties are not assumed for any of the network’s links and
the occurrence of Braess’ paradox is studied for a general configuration.
Keywords: Braess’ paradox; equilibrium flow; traffic network.
1 Introduction
The traffic network can generally be described as a game, where a finite number of interdependent
network users compete with one another by making simultaneous route choices. It is commonly
assumed that network users non-cooperatively interact with one another in the traffic network
in order to minimise their travel costs. This problem is commonly modelled as an N -person
nonzero-sum game (see [6]), and its solution assumes the existence of equilibrium. The concept
of equilibrium in the context of transport systems had appeared in the 1950s ([2, 19]) and is based
on the general assumption that network users are making adjustments to their travel choices until
a state of equilibrium is reached, i.e. when no individual can make a further improvement to their
utility function as a result of any individual choice (thus making an alternative path choice will
not lead to a reduction in individual’s travel time). A specific situation investigated in this work
is the effect of introducing a new link to a congested traffic network, and the likelihood of this
additional capacity to improve the system’s performance (measured by users’ aggregated cost
or travel time). The addition of a link to an existing transport system may lead to undesired
situations.
The well-known Braess’ paradox [3] illustrates situations when adding a new link to a transport
network might not reduce congestion in the network but instead increase it. This is due to
individual entities acting selfishly/separately when making their travel plan choices and hence
forcing the system as a whole not to operate optimally. Deeper insight into this paradox from
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the viewpoint of the structure and characteristics of networks may help transport planners to
avoid the occurrence of Braess-like situations in real-life networks. Nagurney [11] proved that
Braess’ paradox disappears under higher demands, while in [9] it was shown how to avoid Braess’
paradox by adding resources efficiently to a network. Braess’ paradox can be observed in other
applied contexts such as telecommunication networks and power transmission networks, and it
has been studied for an evolutionary variational inequality model of the Internet [12]. Note that
Sheffi [16] coined the term ‘pseudo-paradoxes’ to describe Braess’ paradox and similar traffic flow
phenomena.
Pas and Principio [13] investigated the existence of Braess’ paradox in his classical network
configuration, where travel times of links are specified in such a way that the resulting network
is symmetrical. Their result describes the situations when Braess’ paradox occurs in the above-
mentioned network but is only limited to a specific type of networks in which the attributes
associated with travel times of some links are symmetrical and there are further restrictions
on free flow travel times and delay parameters (see Section 5). In the context of volume-delay
functions and their parameters, it can be argued that symmetry properties of networks, commonly
presented in analyses of the paradox are not very common in real-life situations. Although many
previous studies have investigated Braess’ paradox and various aspects of traffic equilibrium in
asymmetric networks [7, 10, 14, 17, 20], the generalisation of Pas and Principio’s results [13]
devoted to the existence of Braess’ paradox has not been previously studied.
The above-mentioned Pas-Principio’s result is formulated in Corollary 1 (see Section 5) for
the symmetric network configuration M/M+ of Figure 3. Note that free flow travel times for
some links in M/M+ are assumed to be equal to zero. Another assumption is that the delay
parameter for the link (b, c) is not arbitrary, it is equal to the delay parameter of the link (b, d). In
Corollary 2 we do not make those assumptions and thus generalise Pas-Principio’s result. Indeed,
in Corollary 2 there are six arbitrary parameters for travel time functions (α1, α2, α3, β1, β2, β3),
while Corollary 1 only contains four such parameters (α2, α3, β1, β2). These results are devoted to
symmetric networks, where travel times of some links are same. A further generalisation of Pas-
Principio’s result is given in Theorems 1–4, where there are no such restrictions, i.e. the travel
times of the links in the network are arbitrary linear functions without symmetric/asymmetric
properties.
Valiant and Roughgarden [17] proved that Braess’ paradox is likely to occur in a natural
random network model. More precisely, for a given appropriate total flow, they showed that in
almost all networks there is a set of links whose removal improves the travel time at equilibrium,
i.e. Braess’ paradox is widespread in this context. Thus, the fundamental significance of Valiant-
Roughgarden’s result is that the presence of Braess’ paradox is not rare and exceptional, but
rather widespread. Therefore, real-life networks must be analysed from the viewpoint of this
phenomenon before adding/constructing a new link/road. Moreover, Valiant and Roughgarden
[17] showed that ‘the “global” behaviour of an equilibrium flow in a large random network is
similar to that in Braess’ original four-node example’. This important result means that the
classical network configuration introduced by Braess in 1968 is fundamental and it should be
analysed in depth.
In this paper, a natural generalisation of Braess’ network is introduced in Section 2. Such
a generalised network can be reduced to the classical network configuration N/N+, where N+
is the network of Figure 1 and the network N is N+ with the link (b, c) removed. However, in
contrast to the classical case with symmetrical travel times of links, the network configuration
N/N+ has arbitrary linear travel time functions. Note that the conditions for Braess’ paradox
to occur in the generalised network and the corresponding reduced network are the same. The
travel times at equilibria in the networks N and N+ are completely described in Section 3, while
Section 4 provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the occurrence of Braess’ paradox in
these networks. In Section 5, Pas-Principio’s result describing the existence of Braess’ paradox
in the symmetrical network configuration is obtained and generalised. The motivation for such
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an extension was given by Pas and Principio in their conclusions in [13]. Also, the concept of
a pseudo-paradox is introduced and the conditions for its occurrence in N/N+ are given. In
particular, it is shown that in an asymmetrical network configuration the pseudo-paradox is
happening for any total flow. A numerical example is analysed in Section 6, and conclusions are
presented in Section 7. The proofs of all the lemmas and theorems are given in Appendices A
and B, respectively.
2 A Generalisation of Braess’ Network Configuration and Nota-
tion
The classical network configuration introduced by Braess [3] consists of three paths:
P1 = a− b− d, P2 = a− c− d, P3 = a− b− c− d.
This network is denoted by N+, and it has four nodes and five links, where a is the origin of all
travel demand, and d is the destination of all demand (see Figure 1). The network N is N+ with
the link (b, c) removed.
In 2006 Valiant and Roughgarden [17] proved an important and interesting result that Braess’
paradox is likely to happen in a natural random network model. Also, they showed that ‘the
“global” behaviour of an equilibrium flow in a large random network is similar to that in Braess’
original four-node example’. Thus, Braess’ network configuration is of fundamental significance.
u
u
u
ua d
b
c
Figure 1. Braess’ Network Configuration.
Let us consider a natural generalisation of Braess’ network, where every link of the network
in Figure 1 is replaced by a path of arbitrary length (i.e. a route with any number of links).
Thus, the generalised network ‘comprises’ five paths of arbitrary length: (a, b)-path, (b, d)-path,
(a, c)-path, (c, d)-path and (b, c)-path. This is illustrated by the first network in Figure 2, where
the (b, c)-path is of length 3 and other four paths have length 2. Every link (i, j) in the resulting
network has a linear travel time function
αij + βijfij ,
where αij ≥ 0 is the free flow travel time for the link (i, j), βij > 0 is the delay parameter for
(i, j), and fij ≥ 0 is the flow on the link (i, j). A fixed traffic coming from outside the network
is allowed. For example, in Figure 2 the dashed arrows represent a fixed traffic f˜ coming to the
network and then going outside.
The assumption of a linear relationship between traffic volume on a link and the travel time
on it (so-called ‘volume-delay function’) is common in the context of Braess’ paradox. Although
there is evidence to support such a linear approximation[18], many different types of volume-delay
functions, e.g. BPR functions [5], have been applied (see [4] for a review article). However, the
investigation of the non-linear case is not in the scope of this work.
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Figure 2. A generalised network reduced to a four-node network N+.
Suppose we want to decide whether Braess’ paradox occurs when removing a link on the path
going from b to c. If a particular link (i, j) has a fixed flow f˜ coming from outside the network,
i.e. not the internal flow f going from a to d through this link, then its travel time function can
be written as follows:
αij + βijfij = αij + βij(f + f˜) = (αij + βij f˜) + βijf = α˜ij + βijf.
The updated function depends on the internal flow and it is linear, because the external flow f˜ is
fixed and hence α˜ij is a fixed number. Thus, the first step is to update all travel time functions
taking into accounts external flows. Further, it is easy to see that the total travel time functions
for the above paths are linear functions, since the travel time functions for links are linear and
all the links belonging to one of the paths share the same internal flow. For instance, if such a
path P with an internal flow f consists of two links (i, j) and (j, k), then the total travel time
function is as follows:
αij + βijf + αjk + βjkf = αij + αjk + (βij + βjk)f = αP + βP f.
Thus, if all the above paths are replaced by single links, then we obtain Braess’ network with
arbitrary linear travel time functions (see Figure 2):
α1 + β1fab for link (a, b);
α2 + β2fbd for link (b, d);
α3 + β3fbc for link (b, c);
α4 + β4fac for link (a, c);
α5 + β5fcd for link (c, d).
Note that in Braess’ original example [3] and in many of the studies that followed it (e.g. [6]),
the network is symmetric, i.e the time functions for the links (a, b) and (c, d) are the same as well
as the time functions for the links (b, d) and (a, c), and the free flow travel times for the links
(a, b) and (c, d) are equal to zero. The occurrence of Braess’ paradox in this symmetrical network
configuration was described by Pas and Principio [13] (see Corollary 1).
In this paper, we consider a more general situation with arbitrary linear time functions. The
existence of Braess’ paradox in such a network can be decided by using Theorems 1–4, where the
network N is N+ with the link (b, c) removed. Note that the conditions for Braess’ paradox to
occur in the above generalised network and the corresponding reduced network are the same.
Let Q > 0 denote the total flow in N/N+, i.e Q = fab + fac = fbd + fcd. Note that fij and Q
are not necessarily integer numbers. Let us denote
αij = αi + αj ,
e.g. α12 means α1 + α2, and βij is defined similarly. Also,
α = α45 − α12, α¯ = α4 − α13, αˆ = α2 − α35,
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and
β = β1245 = β1 + β2 + β4 + β5, βijk = βi + βj + βk.
The following equality will be used throughout the paper:
α = α¯− αˆ.
Further, we introduce the Braess numbers Bi for i = 1, 2, 3, 4:
B1 = β1β5 − β2β4, B2 = β135β − β12β45, B3 = β245β134 − β24β and B4 = β212β235 − β22β.
Also, two parameters µ1 and µ2 are defined as follows:
µ1 =
αˆβ14 − αβ3
β3β45 + β5β14
, µ2 =
α¯β25 + αβ3
β1β25 + β3β12
.
3 Equilibria in N and N+
It is well known that a user equilibrium always exists, and in a network without capacities, it is
essentially unique (e.g. see [15]). A path P from the origin to the destination is said to have a
vanishing flow if P carries no traffic from the origin to the destination. Note that some links in
the path P may have a non-zero flow that contributes to the traffic of other paths. A path has a
non-vanishing flow if it carries some traffic from the origin to the destination.
A network with one origin and one destination is said to be at equilibrium if
(a) The travel time on paths with non-vanishing flow is the same, and it is denoted by TEq,
and
(b) The travel time on paths with no flow is at least TEq.
The equilibrium described above is associated with aggregated strategic behaviour of all road
users, described as an N -person Nash equilibrium. The concept of Nash equilibrium is related to
a Wardrop equilibrium. In fact, the Nash equilibrium in a network game with a finite number
of players converges to a Wardrop equilibrium when the number of players increases [8]. In
equilibrium, no user can decrease their route travel time by unilaterally switching routes [19]. In
other words, if a network is not at equilibrium, then some users of the network (e.g. drivers) can
switch their routes in order to improve their travel time. However, if a driver decides to switch to
a better route, then the travel time for this route increases, and, after a certain period of time,
it will become impossible to improve drivers’ travel times by switching the routes. Thus, the
equilibrium describes ‘stable state’ behaviour in a network, and no driver has any incentive to
switch routes at equilibrium because it will not improve their current travel times.
The following lemma describes the equilibrium in the network N , which is N+ with the link
(b, c) removed. Note that in Lemma 1 the case (a) corresponds to the situation when the path
P1 has a vanishing flow and P2 has a non-vanishing flow in N . In case (b) the path P1 has a
non-vanishing flow and P2 has a vanishing flow, and in case (c) no path has a vanishing flow.
Also, the cases (a) and (b) in this lemma are mutually exclusive because one of the numbers
−α/β45 and α/β12 is negative, or they both are equal to zero. The proof of Lemma 1 is given in
Appendix A.
Lemma 1 In the network N , the travel time at equilibrium is as follows:
(a) TEq = α45 +Qβ45 if 0 < Q ≤ −α/β45;
(b) TEq = α12 +Qβ12 if 0 < Q ≤ α/β12;
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(c) TEq = α12 + (α+Qβ45)β12/β if Q > max{α/β12;−α/β45}.
The equilibrium in N+ is described by seven cases in Lemma 2. It may be pointed out that
these cases correspond to the following situations in N+: (a) the only path with non-vanishing
flow is P3; (b) the only path with non-vanishing flow is P2; (c) the only path with non-vanishing
flow is P1; (d) the only path with vanishing flow is P1; (e) the only path with vanishing flow is
P2; (f) the only path with vanishing flow is P3; (g) no path has a vanishing flow.
Also, it is not difficult to see that some of the cases in Lemma 2 are mutually exclusive, so
the equilibrium in a particular network N+ is described by some of the presented seven cases.
For example, if αi = βi = 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ 5, then the equilibrium is given by just one case (f).
Lemma 2 In the network N+, the travel time at equilibrium is as follows:
(a) T+Eq = α135 +Qβ135 if 0 < Q ≤ min{αˆ/β35; α¯/β13};
(b) T+Eq = α45 +Qβ45 if 0 < Q ≤ min{−α/β45;−α¯/β4};
(c) T+Eq = α12 +Qβ12 if 0 < Q ≤ min{α/β12;−αˆ/β2};
(d) T+Eq = α45 +Qβ45 − (α¯+Qβ4)β4/β134 if max{α¯/β13;−α¯/β4} < Q ≤ µ1;
(e) T+Eq = α12 +Qβ12 − (αˆ+Qβ2)β2/β235 if max{αˆ/β35;−αˆ/β2} < Q ≤ µ2;
(f) T+Eq = α12 + (α+Qβ45)β12/β if Q > max{α/β12;−α/β45} and
B1 ≥ αˆβ14 + α¯β25
Q
;
(g) T+Eq = α12 + (α+Qβ45)β12/β + gB1/β, where
g =
α¯β − αβ14 −QB1
β3β + β14β25
,
if Q > max{µ1;µ2} and
B1 < αˆβ14 + α¯β25
Q
.
The proof of Lemma 2 is given in Appendix A.
4 Braess’ Paradox in N and N+
Braess’ paradox is said to occur in the network configuration N/N+ for a given total flow Q if
T+Eq > TEq,
where TEq and T
+
Eq are travel times at equilibria in N and N
+, respectively. Thus, Braess’
paradox describes a situation when adding a new link to a network makes a general performance
worse.
The following mega-theorem describes all possible situations when Braess’ paradox may occur
in N/N+ in terms of their paths. In fact, it says that Braess’ paradox may occur in N/N+ only
if, at equilibria, both P1 and P2 have a non-vanishing flow in N , and P3 has a non-vanishing flow
in N+.
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Mega-Theorem. Braess’ paradox may occur in N/N+ in the following cases only:
(a) At equilibria, both N and N+ have no paths with vanishing flow.
(b) At equilibria, N has no path with vanishing flow, and P3 is the only path with non-vanishing
flow in N+.
(c) At equilibria, N has no path with vanishing flow, and P1 is the only path with vanishing
flow in N+.
(d) At equilibria, N has no path with vanishing flow, and P2 is the only path with vanishing
flow in N+.
In the following theorems, we formulate the necessary and sufficient conditions for the exis-
tence of the paradox for all the cases of Mega-Theorem. These theorems are proved in Appendix
B.
Theorem 1 Suppose that at equilibria both N and N+ have no paths with vanishing flow. Then
Braess’ paradox occurs in N/N+ if and only if the Braess number B1 is positive and
max
{
α
β12
;
−α
β45
;µ1;µ2
}
< Q <
αˆβ14 + α¯β25
B1 .
Theorem 2 Suppose that at equilibria N has no path with vanishing flow and P3 is the only path
with non-vanishing flow in N+. Then Braess’ paradox occurs in N/N+ if and only if the Braess
number B2 is positive and
max
{
α
β12
;
−α
β45
;
αˆβ45 + α¯β12
B2
}
< Q ≤ min
{
αˆ
β35
;
α¯
β13
}
.
Theorem 3 Suppose that at equilibria N has no path with vanishing flow and P1 is the only
path with vanishing flow in N+. Then Braess’ paradox occurs in N/N+ if and only if the Braess
number B3 is positive and
max
{
α
β12
;
−α
β45
;
α¯
β13
;
−α¯
β4
;
α¯β4β − αβ134β45
B3
}
< Q ≤ µ1.
Theorem 4 Suppose that at equilibria N has no path with vanishing flow and P2 is the only
path with vanishing flow in N+. Then Braess’ paradox occurs in N/N+ if and only if the Braess
number B4 is positive and
max
{
α
β12
;
−α
β45
;
αˆ
β35
;
−αˆ
β2
;
αˆβ2β + αβ235β12
B4
}
< Q ≤ µ2.
It might be pointed out that if B1 ≥ 0, then B2, B3 and B4 are positive numbers, because
B2 = β12β13 + β35β45 + B1,
B3 = β25β134 + β4(β3β455 + β5β14 + B1),
B4 = β21β235 + β2(β1β335 + β2β13 + B1).
Moreover, Theorems 3 and 4 are mutually exclusive in the sense that they cannot provide intervals
for Q simultaneously. This is true because the inequalities α¯/β13 < µ1 and αˆ/β35 < µ2 are
inconsistent. Note also that if, for example, Theorems 1–3 provide non-empty intervals for Q,
then the interval with highest values of Q is given by Theorem 1, the interval with smallest values
of Q is provided by Theorem 2, and Theorem 3 yields the interval with mid-range values of Q.
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Note that the original assumption βi > 0 for all i can be relaxed by allowing βi = 0 for some
i. This can be done by introducing +∞ and −∞ when a non-zero number is divided by zero.
For example, let us consider Arnott-Small’s example [1]:
α1 = α5 = 0, α2 = α4 = 15, α3 = 7.5, β1 = β5 = 0.01, β2 = β3 = β4 = 0.
Using the formulas in Section 2, we obtain
α = 0, α¯ = αˆ = 7.5, β = 0.02, µ1 = µ2 = 750.
Now let us apply Theorems 1–4 to Arnott-Small’s example, as shown in the following table:
Theorem Braess Number Lower Bound for Q Upper Bound for Q Interval for Q
1 B1 = 10−4 max{0; 0; 750; 750} = 750 1500 ]750;1500[
2 B2 = 3× 10−4 max{0; 0; 500} = 500 min{750; 750} = 750 ]500;750]
3 B3 = 10−6 max{0; 0; 750;−7.5/0; 0} = 750 750 ∅
4 B4 = 10−6 max{0; 0; 750;−7.5/0; 0} = 750 750 ∅
Table 1: Practical application of Theorems 1–4 to Arnott-Small’s example.
Notice that the notation ]500;750] in the last column of the table means an interval of real
numbers from 500 (excluded) to 750 (included). Thus, by Theorems 1 and 2, Braess’ paradox
occurs if 500 < Q < 1500, while Theorems 3 and 4 provide no intervals for Q. In calculating the
lower bounds for Q in these theorems we have division by zero, but this problem is overcome by
putting −7.5/0 = −∞.
5 Symmetrical/Asymmetrical Networks and the Pseudo-Paradox
Let us consider the classical case of a symmetrical network presented by Braess [3] and discussed
in Pas and Principio [13] and other papers. Using the notation introduced in the previous sections,
it can be seen as a particular case of the network configuration N/N+ where time functions are
symmetrical for links that do not share nodes with each other ((a, b) and (c, d), (a, c) and (b, d)),
the free flow travel times for the links (a, b) and (c, d) are equal to zero, and the delay parameter
for (b, c) is equal to the delay parameter of the links (b, d) and (a, c), i.e.
α1 = α5 = 0, α2 = α4, β1 = β5, β2 = β3 = β4.
Also, it is assumed that α2 > α3 and β1 > β2. This network configuration is denoted by M/M
+
(see Figure 3).
u
u
u
ua d
b
c
0, β1 α2, β2
α2, β2 0, β1
α3, β2
Figure 3. The symmetric network M+ (α2 > α3 and β1 > β2).
Pas and Principio [13] determined the occurrence of Braess’ paradox in the symmetrical
network configuration M/M+. This result follows directly from Theorems 1–4:
Corollary 1 ([13]) Braess’ paradox occurs in M/M+ if and only if
2(α2 − α3)
3β1 + β2
< Q <
2(α2 − α3)
β1 − β2 .
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Proof: For the network configuration M/M+, we have
α = 0, α¯ = αˆ = α2 − α3, µ1 = µ2 = (α2 − α3)/β12, B1 = β21 − β22 .
The Braess number B1 is positive because β1 > β2 in M/M+. Under the conditions of Theorem
1, Braess’ paradox occurs if
α2 − α3
β12
< Q <
2β12(α2 − α3)
β21 − β22
=
2(α2 − α3)
β1 − β2 .
Now,
B2 = β21 + 2β212 − β22 = β12(3β1 + β2),
which is a positive number. Therefore, by Theorem 2,
2(α2 − α3)
3β1 + β2
< Q ≤ α2 − α3
β12
.
Note that the lower bound is less than the upper bound because β1 > β2. Thus, the above
inequalities can be written together as
2(α2 − α3)
3β1 + β2
< Q <
2(α2 − α3)
β1 − β2 .
The upper and lower bounds of Theorems 3 and 4 provide no intervals for Q.
Now let M˜/M˜+ denote the above network configuration M/M+ without the assumption that
α2 > α3 and β1 > β2. A proof similar to that of Corollary 1 shows that Braess’ paradox occurs
in M˜/M˜+ in the following cases only:
(a) If β1 > β2 and
α2 − α3
β12
< Q <
2(α2 − α3)
β1 − β2 ;
(b) If
2(α2 − α3)
3β1 + β2
< Q ≤ α2 − α3
β12
.
The both cases imply that α2 > α3. Another implicit relationship is obtained from (b) if we
require that
2(α2 − α3)
3β1 + β2
<
α2 − α3
β12
,
which is equivalent to β1 > β2. Thus, even though the network configuration M˜/M˜
+ extends
M/M+, the conditions for the occurrence of Braess’ paradox are the same.
Let us further extend the network configuration M˜/M˜+ by allowing any non-negative free
flow travel time α1 for the links (a, b) and (c, d) and any positive delay parameter β3 for the link
(b, c). In other words, the symmetrical network configuration S/S+ of Figure 4 is obtained from
N/N+ when time functions are symmetrical for links that do not share nodes with each other:
α1 = α5, α2 = α4, β1 = β5, β2 = β4 (see Figure 4).
u
u
u
ua d
b
c
α1, β1 α2, β2
α2, β2 α1, β1
α3, β3
Figure 4. The symmetric network S+.
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Corollary 2 Braess’ paradox occurs in the symmetrical network configuration S/S+ if and only
if β1 > β2 and
2(α2 − α13)
3β1 + 2β3 − β2 < Q <
2(α2 − α13)
β1 − β2 . (1)
Proof: For the network configuration S/S+, we have
α = 0, α¯ = αˆ = α2 − α13, µ1 = µ2 = (α2 − α13)/β13, B1 = β21 − β22 = β12(β1 − β2).
By Theorem 1, Braess’ paradox occurs if B1 is positive, i.e. β1 > β2, and
α2 − α13
β13
< Q <
2(α2 − α13)
β1 − β2 .
Now,
B2 = β1312β12 − β212 = β12(3β1 + 2β3 − β2).
Therefore, by Theorem 2, Braess’ paradox occurs if 3β1 + 2β3 > β2 and
2(α2 − α13)
3β1 + 2β3 − β2 < Q ≤
α2 − α13
β13
.
This implies that α2 > α13. Also, it is easy to see that the lower bound is less than the upper
bound only if β1 > β2, which is stronger than 3β1 + 2β3 > β2. Thus, the above inequalities can
be written together as
2(α2 − α13)
3β1 + 2β3 − β2 < Q <
2(α2 − α13)
β1 − β2 .
The upper and lower bounds of Theorems 3 and 4 provide no intervals for Q.
In Corollary 2 there is an implicit assumption that α2 > α13 because Q is a positive number
(if α2 ≤ α13, then (1) provides no interval for Q). We will see in Corollary 6 what is happening
with the times at equilibria in S/S+ if Q exceeds the upper bound in (1), where α2 > α13 and
β1 > β2.
The asymmetrical network configuration A/A+ of Figure 5 is obtained from N/N+ when the
time functions for the links (a, b) and (a, c) are the same as well as the time functions for the
links (b, d) and (c, d), i.e.
α1 = α4, α2 = α5, β1 = β4, β2 = β5 (see Figure 5).
u
u
u
ua d
b
c
α1, β1 α2, β2
α1, β1 α2, β2
α3, β3
Figure 5. The asymmetric network A+.
Corollary 3 Braess’ paradox cannot occur in the asymmetrical network configuration A/A+.
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Proof: For the network configuration A/A+, we have
α = 0, α¯ = αˆ = −α3, B1 = β1β2 − β2β1 = 0, µ1 ≤ 0, µ2 ≤ 0.
It is easy to see that Theorems 1–4 provide no intervals, so Braess’ paradox is impossible.
Using Lemmas 1 and 2 we see that the equilibria in A/A+ are described by the cases (c) and
(f), respectively, i.e. in A no path has a vanishing flow, and in A+ the only path with vanishing
flow is P3. Also, the flow Q is distributed evenly between P1 and P2 and
TEq = T
+
Eq = α12 + 0.5β12Q.
Thus, the travel times at equilibria in A and A+ are equal for any Q. This observation is important
because adding a new link to A does not improve the general performance, even though Braess’
paradox is not occurring.
We say that the pseudo-paradox occurs in the network configuration N/N+ if
T+Eq = TEq
for an interval of values for Q (as opposite to a single point). In other words, we exclude single
values of Q when going from the situation “Braess’ paradox does not occur” to “Braess’ paradox
occurs”.
Thus, the pseudo-paradox describes a situation when adding a new link to a network does
not change the general performance for a range of values of the total flow. As seen above, the
pseudo-paradox occurs in the asymmetrical network configuration A/A+ for any Q > 0. In the
authors’ view, the pseudo-paradox is a more common phenomenon than Braess’ paradox.
Corollary 4 For the network configuration N/N+, the pseudo-paradox occurs if
(a) 0 < Q ≤ min{−α/β45;−α¯/β4};
(b) 0 < Q ≤ min{α/β12;−αˆ/β2};
(c) Q > max{α/β12;−α/β45} and QB1 ≥ αˆβ14 + α¯β25;
(d) B1 = 0, αˆβ14 + α¯β25 > 0 and Q > max{α/β12;−α/β45;µ1;µ2}.
Proof: The first three cases follow immediately from the cases (a,b), (b,c), (c,f) of the proof
of theorems as discussed in the first paragraph of Appendix B. The last case is similar to the
case (c,g), where T+Eq = TEq must be satisfied. This is equivalent to gB1/β = 0. Since g > 0,
we obtain B1 = 0, and therefore αˆβ14 + α¯β25 > 0. In addition, there are lower bounds for Q in
Lemma 1 (c) and Lemma 2 (g).
The application of Corollary 4 (c) to the asymmetrical network configuration A/A+ confirms
the above observation:
Corollary 5 The pseudo-paradox occurs in the asymmetrical network configuration A/A+ for
any Q > 0.
By Corollary 2, Braess’ paradox occurs in the symmetrical network configuration if β1 > β2,
α2 > α13, and the total flow Q is between the lower and upper bounds in (1). Corollary 4 (c)
allows us to see what is happening with the times at equilibria if Q exceeds the upper bound:
Corollary 6 Suppose that Braess’ paradox occurs in the symmetrical network configuration S/S+,
i.e. β1 > β2 and α2 > α13. Then S/S
+ is experiencing the pseudo-paradox for any
Q ≥ 2(α2 − α13)
β1 − β2 .
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Proof: We know that α = 0, α¯ = αˆ = α2 − α13 and B1 = β12(β1 − β2) > 0. Therefore, the
second inequality in Corollary 4 (c) is equivalent to
Qβ12(β1 − β2) ≥ 2(α2 − α13)β12,
as required.
Thus, under the conditions of Corollary 6, some improvement in S/S+ is only possible if Q is
less than the lower bound in (1), followed by Braess’ paradox until Q reaches the upper bound
in (1), followed by the pseudo-paradox for larger values of Q.
6 Numerical Example
Let us consider the generalised network G+ shown in the left part of Figure 6, where the free
flow travel times and delay parameters are indicated for all eleven links. As explained in Section
2, this network can be reduced to the network N+ shown in the right part of Figure 6. Now
suppose we want to decide whether Braess’ paradox occurs in G+ when removing any link on the
path going from b to c; let us denote the resulting network by G. This is equivalent to finding
the conditions for Braess’ paradox to occur in the network configuration N/N+.
u
u
u
uu uu uu
u
a d
b
c
1,14
1,16 16,15
20,171,1
2,1
3,115,3
25,5 1,9
1,10
⇒ u
u
u
ua d
b
c
2, 30 36, 32
6, 3
40, 8 2, 19
Figure 6. A generalised network G+ reduced to a four-node network N+.
Thus, the network configuration N/N+ has the following parameters:
α1 = 2, α2 = 36, α3 = 6, α4 = 40, α5 = 2,
β1 = 30, β2 = 32, β3 = 3, β4 = 8, β5 = 19.
Using the formulas in Section 2, we obtain
α = α45 − α12 = 4, α¯ = α4 − α13 = 32, αˆ = α2 − α35 = 28,
and
β = β1 + β2 + β4 + β5 = 89, µ1 =
αˆβ14 − αβ3
β3β45 + β5β14
= 1.31, µ2 =
α¯β25 + αβ3
β1β25 + β3β12
= 0.96.
Note that rounded numbers (to 2 dp) are used instead of exact values.
Let us apply Theorems 1–4, as shown in the following table:
Th. Braess No. Lower Bound for Q Upper Bound for Q Interval for Q
1 B1 = 314 max{0.06;−0.15; 1.31; 0.96} = 1.31 8.59 ]1.31;8.59[
2 B2 = 2954 max{0.06;−0.15; 0.93} = 0.93 min{1.27; 0.97} = 0.97 ]0.93;0.97]
3 B3 = 24193 max{0.06;−0.15; 0.97;−4; 0.76} = 0.97 1.31 ]0.97;1.31]
4 B4 = 116440 max{0.06;−0.15; 1.27;−0.88; 0.80} = 1.27 0.96 ∅
Table 2: Practical application of Theorems 1–4.
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Thus, Braess’ paradox occurs in N/N+ in the following cases:
1.31 < Q < 8.59 by Theorem 1,
0.93 < Q ≤ 0.97 by Theorem 2,
0.97 < Q ≤ 1.31 by Theorem 3.
Theorem 4 produces no interval. Therefore, Braess’ paradox occurs if and only if
0.93 < Q < 8.59.
By Corollary 4 (c), the pseudo-paradox happens if
Q ≥ 8.59,
i.e. under this condition the travel times at equilibria in N and N+ are the same and there is no
improvement in the network.
Thus, some improvement of travel times in the network when adding the link (b, c) only occurs
for small values of Q (Q < 0.93). The extent of this improvement and of Braess’ paradox can be
seen from the equilibrium functions found (to 2 dp) by Lemmas 1 and 2:
TEq =
{
38 + 62Q if 0 < Q ≤ 0.06;
40.79 + 18.81Q if Q > 0.06;
and
T+Eq =

10 + 52Q if 0 < Q ≤ 0.97;
35.76 + 25.44Q if 0.97 < Q ≤ 1.31;
45.10 + 18.31Q if 1.31 < Q < 8.59;
40.79 + 18.81Q if Q ≥ 8.59.
The above findings for the reduced network N/N+ also hold for the generalised network
G/G+. Let us summarise them in the following table:
Network Improvement Braess’ Paradox Pseudo-Paradox Travel Times at Equilibria
N/N+ Q < 0.93 0.93 < Q < 8.59 Q ≥ 8.59 TEq/T+Eq
G/G+ Q < 0.93 0.93 < Q < 8.59 Q ≥ 8.59 TEq/T+Eq
Table 3: Summary of findings for the networks G/G+ and N/N+.
The above equilibrium functions and Table 3 can be easily used to analyse the generalised
network G+ for particular values of the total demand (flow) Q. For example, suppose that the
following values of Q are of interest: 0.5, 5, 10. The results are given in Table 4 (to 1 dp).
Total Demand Q Result Travel Time in G (TEq) Travel Time in G
+ (T+Eq)
0.5 Improvement 50.2 36.0
5 Braess’ Paradox 134.8 136.6
10 Pseudo-Paradox 228.9 228.9
Table 4: Analysis of particular values of Q in the network configuration G/G+.
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7 Conclusions and Further Research
Braess’ paradox has been investigated in symmetric four-link networks by a number of authors.
This paper provides a generalisation of Pas and Principio’s findings [13] to non-symmetric net-
works and shows, for a given congested network, that Braess’ paradox occurs if and only if
the total demand of travel (Q) lies within a certain range of values. The motivation for such
an extension was given by Pas and Principio in their conclusions in [13]. Also, in the context
of volume-delay functions and their parameters, it can be argued that symmetry properties of
networks are not very common in real-life situations.
A further research direction is to generalise results presented in [13] and this work, and find the
necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of Braess’ paradox with arbitrary travel times
of links in networks with complex topology. Further extensions of this work might also include
the investigation of additional network features that were not illustrated in the classical problem
introduced by Braess and his colleagues [3]. Of specific relevance to transport researchers is the
study of networks in which volume-delay functions are not linear in their parameters. Another
future direction suggested by Pas and Principio [13] would be the investigation of Braess’ paradox
in situations where the overall demand (Q) for travel is not constant (i.e. inelastic). The effect of
the network symmetry on the Price of Anarchy (the measure of the efficiency of the overall system
which can be formulated as a ratio between ‘user equilibrium’ and ‘system optimum’ travel times)
is another direction for further research.
Appendix A: Proof of the Lemmas
Lemma 1
Proof: Let us denote fab by h. Then fbd = h and fac = fcd = Q− h. We have
T1 = α12 + hβ12 and T2 = α45 + (Q− h)β45,
where Ti is the travel time on the path Pi.
Case (a): Suppose that P1 has a vanishing flow and P2 has a non-vanishing flow. Then Q >
h = 0 and
T1 = α12 and T2 = α45 +Qβ45.
At equilibrium, T1 ≥ T2, i.e. α12 ≥ α45 +Qβ45 or Q ≤ −α/β45. The travel time at equilibrium is
TEq = T2 = α45 +Qβ45.
Case (b): Assume that P1 has a non-vanishing flow and P2 has a vanishing flow. We have
Q = h > 0 and
T1 = α12 +Qβ12 and T2 = α45.
At equilibrium, T1 ≤ T2, i.e. α12 + Qβ12 ≤ α45 or Q ≤ α/β12. The travel time at equilibrium is
as follows:
TEq = T1 = α12 +Qβ12.
Case (c): Suppose that no path has a vanishing flow. We have Q > h > 0. At equilibrium,
T1 = T2, i.e.
α12 + hβ12 = α45 + (Q− h)β45
or
h = (α+Qβ45)/β.
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Therefore, the condition Q > h > 0 is equivalent to
Q > (α+Qβ45)/β > 0
or
Q > max{α/β12;−α/β45}.
Finally,
TEq = T1 = α12 + (α+Qβ45)β12/β.
Lemma 2
Proof: Let us denote fab by f , and fbc by g. Then fac = Q− f and, using the conservation-of-
flow constraints, fbd = f − g and fcd = Q− f + g (see Figure 7). We have
T1 = α12+fβ12−gβ2, T2 = α45+Qβ45−fβ45+gβ5 and T3 = α135+Qβ5+f(β1−β5)+gβ35,
where Ti is the travel time on the path Pi.
u
u
u
ua d
b
c
f f − g
Q− f Q− f + g
g
Figure 7. The link flows in N+.
Case (a): The only path with non-vanishing flow is P3, i.e. P1 and P2 have a vanishing flow.
Therefore, Q = f = g > 0 and
T1 = α12 +Qβ1, T2 = α45 +Qβ5 and T3 = α135 +Qβ135.
At equilibrium, T1 ≥ T3 and T2 ≥ T3, i.e.{
α12 +Qβ1 ≥ α135 +Qβ135;
α45 +Qβ5 ≥ α135 +Qβ135.
Thus,
0 < Q ≤ min{αˆ/β35; α¯/β13}
and
T+Eq = T3 = α135 +Qβ135.
Case (b): The only path with non-vanishing flow is P2. Hence Q > f = g = 0 and
T1 = α12, T2 = α45 +Qβ45 and T3 = α135 +Qβ5.
At equilibrium, T1 ≥ T2 and T3 ≥ T2, i.e.{
α12 ≥ α45 +Qβ45;
α135 +Qβ5 ≥ α45 +Qβ45.
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Thus,
0 < Q ≤ min{−α/β45;−α¯/β4}
and
T+Eq = T2 = α45 +Qβ45.
Case (c): The only path with non-vanishing flow is P1. Hence Q = f > g = 0 and
T1 = α12 +Qβ12, T2 = α45 and T3 = α135 +Qβ1.
At equilibrium, T2 ≥ T1 and T3 ≥ T1, i.e.{
α45 ≥ α12 +Qβ12;
α135 +Qβ1 ≥ α12 +Qβ12.
Thus,
0 < Q ≤ min{α/β12;−αˆ/β2}
and
T+Eq = T1 = α12 +Qβ12.
Case (d): The only path with vanishing flow is P1. We obtain Q > f = g > 0 and
T1 = α12 + fβ1, T2 = α45 +Qβ45 − fβ4 and T3 = α135 +Qβ5 + fβ13.
At equilibrium, T2 = T3 and T1 ≥ T2, i.e.{
α45 +Qβ45 − fβ4 = α135 +Qβ5 + fβ13;
α12 + fβ1 ≥ α45 +Qβ45 − fβ4; or
{
f = (α¯+Qβ4)/β134;
f ≥ (α+Qβ45)/β14.
Therefore,
(α¯+Qβ4)/β134 ≥ (α+Qβ45)/β14
or
Q(β45β134 − β4β14) ≤ α¯β14 − αβ134.
Note that β45β134 − β4β14 = β3β45 + β5β14 and, using α¯ = α+ αˆ,
α¯β14 − αβ134 = αˆβ14 − αβ3. (2)
Hence
Q ≤ αˆβ14 − αβ3
β3β45 + β5β14
,
i.e. Q ≤ µ1. Now, taking into account that Q > f > 0, the following is obtained:
Q > (α¯+Qβ4)/β134 > 0,
which is equivalent to
Q > max{α¯/β13;−α¯/β4}.
Finally,
T+Eq = T2 = α45 +Qβ45 − (α¯+Qβ4)β4/β134.
Case (e): The only path with vanishing flow is P2. We obtain Q = f > g > 0 and
T1 = α12 +Qβ12 − gβ2, T2 = α45 + gβ5 and T3 = α135 +Qβ1 + gβ35.
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At equilibrium, T1 = T3 and T2 ≥ T3, i.e.{
α12 +Qβ12 − gβ2 = α135 +Qβ1 + gβ35;
α45 + gβ5 ≥ α135 +Qβ1 + gβ35; or
{
g = (αˆ+Qβ2)/β235;
g ≤ (α¯−Qβ1)/β3.
Therefore,
(αˆ+Qβ2)/β235 ≤ (α¯−Qβ1)/β3
or
Q(β2β3 + β1β235) ≤ α¯β235 − αˆβ3.
Now, rearranging the left-hand side, and using αˆ = α¯− α, we obtain
Q(β1β25 + β3β12) ≤ α¯β25 + αβ3.
Thus, Q ≤ µ2. Taking into account that Q > g > 0, we obtain
Q > (αˆ+Qβ2)/β235 > 0,
which is equivalent to
Q > max{αˆ/β35;−αˆ/β2}.
Finally,
T+Eq = T1 = α12 +Qβ12 − (αˆ+Qβ2)β2/β235.
Case (f): The only path with vanishing flow is P3. We obtain Q > f > g = 0 and
T1 = α12 + fβ12, T2 = α45 +Qβ45 − fβ45 and T3 = α135 +Qβ5 + f(β1 − β5).
At equilibrium, T1 = T2 and T3 ≥ T2, i.e.{
α12 + fβ12 = α45 +Qβ45 − fβ45;
α135 +Qβ5 + f(β1 − β5) ≥ α45 +Qβ45 − fβ45; or
{
f = (α+Qβ45)/β;
f ≥ (α¯+Qβ4)/β14.
Therefore,
(α+Qβ45)/β ≥ (α¯+Qβ4)/β14
or
Q(β14β45 − ββ4) ≥ α¯β − αβ14.
It is not difficult to see that Q(β14β45 − ββ4) = QB1 and, using α = α¯− αˆ,
α¯β − αβ14 = α¯(β14 + β25)− (α¯− αˆ)β14 = αˆβ14 + α¯β25. (3)
Thus,
B1 ≥ αˆβ14 + α¯β25
Q
.
Taking into account that Q > f > 0, we obtain
Q > (α+Qβ45)/β > 0,
which is equivalent to
Q > max{α/β12;−α/β45}.
Finally,
T+Eq = T1 = α12 + (α+Qβ45)β12/β.
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Case (g): No path has a vanishing flow, and so Q > f > g > 0. At equilibrium, T1 = T2 and
T2 = T3, i.e.{
fβ = α+ gβ25 +Qβ45;
fβ14 + gβ3 = α¯+Qβ4;
or
{
f = (α+ gβ25 +Qβ45)/β;
g = (α¯β − αβ14 −Q(β45β14 − β4β)) /(β3β + β14β25).
It is easy to see that β45β14 − β4β = B1, so
g =
α¯β − αβ14 −QB1
β3β + β14β25
.
The condition g > 0 is equivalent to α¯β − αβ14 − QB1 > 0 or QB1 < α¯β − αβ14. Using (3),
we obtain
B1 < αˆβ14 + α¯β25
Q
.
The condition f > g can be written as (α+gβ25 +Qβ45)/β > g or g < (α+Qβ45)/β14. Hence
α¯β − αβ14 −QB1
β3β + β14β25
<
α+Qβ45
β14
,
which is equivalent to
Q(B1β14 + β45β25β14 + β3β45β) > α¯β14β − α(β214 + β3β + β25β14).
It is easy to see that B1β14 + β45β25β14 = β5β14β and β214 + β3β + β25β14 = β134β. Therefore,
Q(β3β45β + β5β14β) > α¯β14β − αβ134β or Q(β3β45 + β5β14) > α¯β14 − αβ134.
Using (2), we obtain Q > µ1.
Now let us consider the condition Q > f , which can be written as Q > (α + gβ25 +Qβ45)/β
or (Qβ12 − α)/β25 > g. Hence
Qβ12 − α
β25
>
α¯β − αβ14 −QB1
β3β + β14β25
or
Q(β12β25β14 + β25B1 + β3β12β) > α¯β25β + αβ3β.
It is not difficult to check that β12β25β14 + β25B1 = β1β25β and hence
Q(β1β25β + β3β12β) > α¯β25β + αβ3β,
i.e. Q > µ2.
Finally,
T+Eq = T1 = α12 + fβ12 − gβ2 = α12 + (α+Qβ45)β12/β + g(β25β12/β − β2).
It is easy to see that β25β12/β − β2 = B1/β, and so
T+Eq = α12 + (α+Qβ45)β12/β + gB1/β.
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Appendix B: Proof of the Theorems
We will consider the cases (i,j), where (i) is one of the cases of Lemma 1, and (j) is one of the
cases of Lemma 2. First of all, suppose that at equilibrium the path P3 has a vanishing flow in
N+, i.e. the flow at equilibrium may only use P1 and P2, or just one of those paths. It is easy to
see that the same flow is an equilibrium flow in N , and the travel times at equilibria are equal.
Thus, Braess’ paradox cannot happen in the following cases: (a,b), (a,c), (a,f), (b,b), (b,c), (b,f),
(c,b),(c,c),(c,f). Note that T+Eq = TEq in the cases (a,b), (b,c) and (c,f), while the conditions in
other cases are inconsistent. For example, in the case (a,c), Lemma 1 (a) implies α < 0, while
Lemma 2 (c) implies α > 0, so the bounds are inconsistent.
Thus, there are 12 cases to consider. We will see that Braess’ paradox may occur in four cases
only: (c,a), (c,d), (c,e) and (c,g). This proves Mega-Theorem, while the cases themselves provide
proofs of Theorems 2, 3, 4 and 1, respectively.
Case (a,a): Assume that T+Eq > TEq, which implies Q(β13 − β4) > α¯. Since 0 < Q ≤ α¯/β13, we
obtain α¯ > 0. Therefore, β13 − β4 > 0 and
Q >
α¯
β13 − β4 >
α¯
β13
,
contrary to Q ≤ α¯/β13.
Case (a,d): T+Eq > TEq implies α¯+Qβ4 < 0, i.e. Q < −α¯/β4, but Q > −α¯/β4 in the case (d).
Case (a,e): We will show that the upper and lower bounds imposed on Q in this case are
inconsistent.
Let us first assume that αˆ ≥ 0. We have Q ≤ −α/β45 from (a) and Q > αˆ/β35 from (e).
Hence αˆ/β35 < −α/β45 or
αˆβ45 + αβ35 < 0. (4)
From (e), we obtain
αˆ
β35
<
α¯β25 + αβ3
β1β25 + β3β12
.
Using α¯ = α+ αˆ, the above inequality is equivalent to
αˆ(β1β25 + β3β12 − β25β35)− αβ35β235 < 0.
Since β1β25 + β3β12 − β25β35 = (β1 − β5)β235, we have
αˆ(β1 − β5)− αβ35 < 0. (5)
Adding (4) and (5), we obtain αˆβ14 < 0, contrary to the assumption αˆ ≥ 0.
Now suppose that αˆ < 0. We have Q ≤ −α/β45 from (a) and Q > −αˆ/β2 from (e). Hence
−αˆ/β2 < −α/β45 or
αˆβ45 − αβ2 > 0. (6)
From (e), we obtain
−αˆ
β2
<
α¯β25 + αβ3
β1β25 + β3β12
.
Hence, using α¯ = α+ αˆ,
αˆ(β1β25 + β3β12 + β2β25) + αβ2β235 > 0.
It is easy to see that β1β25 + β3β12 + β2β25 = β12β235, so
αˆβ12 + αβ2 > 0. (7)
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Adding (6) and (7), we obtain αˆβ > 0, a contradiction.
Case (a,g): We will show that the upper and lower bounds imposed on Q in this case are
inconsistent. We have µ1 < Q ≤ −α/β45, i.e.
αˆβ45 + αβ5 < 0. (8)
Also, from (g),
QB1 < αˆβ14 + α¯β25. (9)
Suppose that B1 = 0, i.e.
β1β5 = β2β4 (10)
and
0 < αˆβ14 + α¯β25.
From (10), we obtain β1 = β2β4/β5, β2 = β1β5/β4 and β1/β4 = β2/β5. Therefore,
0 < αˆβ14 + α¯β25 = αˆβ4(1 +
β2
β5
) + α¯β5(1 +
β1
β4
) = (αˆβ4 + α¯β5)(1 +
β2
β5
).
Thus, αˆβ4 + α¯β5 > 0. Now
0 < αˆβ4 + α¯β5 = αˆβ4 + (α+ αˆ)β5 = αˆβ45 + αβ5,
contrary to (8).
Using α¯ = α+ αˆ, we can re-write (9) in the following form:
QB1 < αβ25 + αˆβ.
Assume now that B1 < 0, i.e.
Q >
αβ25 + αˆβ
B1 .
Since Q ≤ −α/β45, we obtain
αβ25 + αˆβ
B1 <
−α
β45
or
α(B1 + β25β45) + αˆβ45β > 0.
It is not difficult to see that the last inequality is equivalent to
αβ5β + αˆβ45β > 0
or
αβ5 + αˆβ45 > 0,
contrary to (8).
Finally, let us suppose that B1 > 0, i.e.
Q <
αβ25 + αˆβ
B1 .
Since Q > µ1, we obtain
αˆβ14 − αβ3
L
<
αβ25 + αˆβ
B1 ,
where L = β3β45 + β5β14. The last inequality is equivalent to
αˆ(βL− β14B1) + α(β25L+ β3B1) > 0.
20
It is easy to see that
βL− β14B1 = β45(ββ3 + β14β25)
and
β25L+ β3B1 = β5(ββ3 + β14β25).
Thus,
αˆβ45 + αβ5 > 0,
contrary to (8).
Case (b,a): Assume that T+Eq > TEq, which implies Q(β35 − β2) > αˆ. Since 0 < Q ≤ αˆ/β35, we
obtain αˆ > 0. Therefore, β35 − β2 > 0 and
Q >
αˆ
β35 − β2 >
αˆ
β35
,
contrary to Q ≤ αˆ/β35.
Case (b,d): We will show that the upper and lower bounds imposed on Q in this case are
inconsistent.
Let us first assume that α¯ ≥ 0. We have Q ≤ α/β12 from (b) and Q > α¯/β13 from (d). Hence
α¯/β13 < α/β12 or
α¯β12 − αβ13 < 0. (11)
From (d,) we obtain
α¯
β13
<
αˆβ14 − αβ3
L
,
where L = β3β45 + β5β14. Using αˆ = α¯− α, the above inequality is equivalent to
α¯(L− β13β14) + αβ13β134 < 0
or
α¯(β5 − β1) + αβ13 < 0. (12)
Adding (11) and (12), we obtain α¯β25 < 0, contrary to the assumption α¯ ≥ 0.
Now suppose that α¯ < 0. We have −α¯/β4 < α/β12 or
αβ4 + α¯β12 > 0. (13)
From (d) we obtain
−α¯
β4
<
αˆβ14 − αβ3
L
,
where L = β3β45 + β5β14. Using αˆ = α¯− α, the above inequality is equivalent to
α¯(L+ β4β14)− αβ4β134 > 0
or
α¯β45 − αβ4 > 0. (14)
Adding (13) and (14), we obtain α¯β > 0, contrary to the assumption α¯ < 0.
Case (b,e): T+Eq > TEq implies αˆ+Qβ2 < 0, i.e. Q < −αˆ/β2, but Q > −αˆ/β2 in the case (e).
Case (b,g): We will show that the upper and lower bounds imposed on Q in this case are
inconsistent. We have µ2 < Q ≤ α/β12, i.e.
α¯β12 − αβ1 < 0,
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or, using α = α¯− αˆ,
αˆβ1 + α¯β2 < 0. (15)
From (g), we have
QB1 < αˆβ14 + α¯β25. (16)
Suppose that B1 = 0, i.e.
β1β5 = β2β4 (17)
and
0 < αˆβ14 + α¯β25.
From (17), we obtain β4 = β1β5/β2, β5 = β2β4/β1 and β4/β1 = β5/β2. Therefore,
0 < αˆβ14 + α¯β25 = αˆβ1(1 +
β5
β2
) + α¯β2(1 +
β4
β1
) = (αˆβ1 + α¯β2)(1 +
β5
β2
).
Thus, αˆβ1 + α¯β2 > 0, contrary to (15).
Assume now that B1 < 0, i.e.
Q >
αˆβ14 + α¯β25
B1 .
Since Q ≤ α/β12 = (α¯− αˆ)/β12, we obtain
(α¯− αˆ)B1 < αˆβ12β14 + α¯β12β25
or
αˆ(β12β14 + B1) + α¯(β12β25 − B1) > 0.
The last inequality is equivalent to
αˆβ1β + α¯β2β > 0,
contrary to (15).
Finally, let us suppose that B1 > 0, i.e.
Q <
αˆβ14 + α¯β25
B1 .
Since, Q > µ2, we obtain
α¯β25 + αβ3
β1β25 + β3β12
<
αˆβ14 + α¯β25
B1 .
Using α = α¯− αˆ, the last inequality can be re-written as follows:
αˆX + α¯Y > 0, (18)
where
X = β14(β1β25 + β3β12) + β3B1
and
Y = β25(β1β25 + β3β12 − B1)− β3B1.
It is not difficult to see that
X = β1(β14β25 + β3β)
and
Y = β2(β14β25 + β3β).
Thus, (18) is equivalent to
αˆβ1 + α¯β2 > 0,
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contrary to (15).
Case (c,a): This case corresponds to Theorem 2. It is easy to see that T+Eq > TEq is equivalent
to
Q(β135β − β12β45) > αˆβ + αβ12
or, using α = α¯− αˆ,
QB2 > αˆβ45 + α¯β12.
Moreover,
max
{
α
β12
;
−α
β45
}
< Q ≤ min
{
αˆ
β35
;
α¯
β13
}
,
which implies αˆ > 0 and α¯ > 0. Therefore, αˆβ45 + α¯β12 > 0 and B2 > 0, i.e.
Q >
αˆβ45 + α¯β12
B2 .
Case (c,d): This case corresponds to Theorem 3. It is easy to see that TEq < T
+
Eq is equivalent
to
α12 + (α+Qβ45)β12/β < α45 +Qβ45 − (α¯+Qβ4)β4/β134
or
QB3 > α¯β4β − αβ134β45.
In addition, we have
max
{
α
β12
;
−α
β45
;
α¯
β13
;
−α¯
β4
}
< Q ≤ µ1.
Let us show that these inequalities are inconsistent if B3 ≤ 0. Using (2), the inequality
−α/β45 < µ1 can be written as follows:
−α
β45
<
α¯β14 − αβ134
β3β45 + β5β14
,
which is equivalent to
α¯β14β45 − α(β134β45 − β3β45 − β5β14) > 0
or
α¯ >
αβ4
β45
.
Therefore,
QB3 > α¯β4β − αβ134β45 > αβ4
β45
β4β − αβ134β45 = −αB3
β45
.
Thus,
QB3 > −αB3
β45
,
which is not satisfied if B3 = 0. If B3 < 0, then we obtain
Q <
−α
β45
,
which is inconsistent with the inequality Q > −α/β45. We conclude that B3 > 0 and hence
Q >
α¯β4β − αβ134β45
B3 .
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Case (c,e): This case corresponds to Theorem 4. It is not difficult to see that TEq < T
+
Eq is
equivalent to
α12 + (α+Qβ45)β12/β < α12 +Qβ12 − (αˆ+Qβ2)β2/β235
or
QB4 > αˆβ2β + αβ235β12.
Moreover, we obtain
max
{
α
β12
;
−α
β45
;
αˆ
β35
;
−αˆ
β2
}
< Q ≤ µ2.
Let us show that these inequalities are inconsistent if B4 ≤ 0. Using α¯ = α+ αˆ, the inequality
α/β12 < µ2 can be written as follows:
α
β12
<
αβ235 + αˆβ25
β1β25 + β3β12
,
which is equivalent to
α(β12β235 − β1β25 − β3β12) + αˆβ12β25 > 0
or
αˆ >
−αβ2
β12
.
Therefore,
QB4 > αˆβ2β + αβ235β12 > −αβ2
β12
β2β + αβ235β12 =
αB4
β12
.
Thus,
QB4 > αB4
β12
,
which is not satisfied if B4 = 0. If B4 < 0, then
Q <
α
β12
,
which is inconsistent with the inequality Q > α/β12. Thus, B4 > 0 and hence
Q >
αˆβ2β + αβ235β12
B4 .
Case (c,g): This case corresponds to Theorem 1. It is easy to see that T+Eq > TEq is equivalent
to
gB1/β > 0.
From the proof of Lemma 2 we know that g > 0. Hence B1 > 0. Therefore, the last inequality in
the case (g) can be written as
Q <
αˆβ14 + α¯β25
B1 .
In addition, we have
max
{
α
β12
;
−α
β45
;µ1;µ2
}
< Q.
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